

# How Should Climate Change Uncertainty

Impact Social Valuation and Policy?

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# What is the challenge?

- ▷ **human impact** on the environment is **NOT** internalized by markets - social cost  $\neq$  private costs
- ▷ two sources of uncertainty
  - **geosciences**:  $CO_2$  emissions today impact the future climate
  - **economics**: climate change in the future alters economic opportunities and social well-being

# What we are aiming for

A **computationally tractable laboratory** to explore subjective uncertainty including potential model misspecification and ambiguity across models. Goals:

- ▷ **assess** the impact of uncertainty on climate policy outcomes
- ▷ **isolate** the forms of uncertainty that are most consequential for these outcomes.

**Quantitative story-telling with multiple stories**

# What does asset valuation provide?

Asset pricing theory: *how do markets assess the investment opportunities in the face of uncertain future net payoffs?*

- ▷ “assets” include financial, physical, human, organizational and environmental “capital”
- ▷ associated with each asset is a prospective sequence of net payoffs to investments

Apply these tools to social instead of market valuation!!

# Social cost of carbon (SCC)

Commonly referred to in policy discussions but **meanings** and **targets** of measurement *differ* across applications.

We use a well-posed version as an **analytical tool** to assess the impact of uncertainty.

- ▷ **externality** - carbon **emissions** alter the **climate**, which in turn impacts economic **opportunities** and social well-being in the future
- ▷ **social cost of carbon** includes the socially efficient (Pigouvian) tax on carbon emissions that “**corrects**” this “**externality**”

# Confronting policy uncertainty

## Tension:

- ▷ **limited understanding** of the mechanism by which policy influences economic outcomes
- ▷ **demand for precise answers** by the public and/or government policy-makers

# Where does uncertainty emerge?

## Quantitative storytelling with multiple stories

- ▷ **risk**: (uncertainty within models) each model has explicit **random impulses**
- ▷ **ambiguity**: (uncertainty across models) multiple models give rise to multiple “stories” with **different implications**
- ▷ **misspecification**: (uncertainty about models) each model is an **abstraction** and not intended to be a complete description of reality

Today I will feature **ambiguity**, but **misspecification** is also worthy of serious consideration.

# Navigating uncertainty

Probability models we use in practice are **misspecified**, and there is **ambiguity** as to which among multiple models is the best one.

- ▷ aims:
  - use models in **sensible ways** rather than discard them
  - use tools from **probability and statistics** to **limit** the type and amount of uncertainty that is entertained
- ▷ aversion - **dislike** of uncertainty about probabilities over future events
- ▷ implementation - **target** the uncertainty components with the **most adverse consequences** for the decision maker

# Decision theory

Hansen-Miao (2018) propose a recursive implementation of the **smooth ambiguity** model in continuous time. Discrete-time version originally axiomatized by Klibanoff-Marinacci-Mukerji (2005).

- ▷ ambiguity about **local mean specification** in the state dynamics
- ▷ axiomatic defense justifies a **differential aversion** to ambiguity over models
- ▷ **equivalence** between the **smooth ambiguity** and **recursive robust choice of priors** (Hansen-Sargent, 2007)
- ▷ additional adjustment for **potential model misspecification** as in Hansen and Sargent (2009)

Collapse **high-dimensional** uncertainty down to a **low-dimensional** (one or two parameter) representation

# Formal approach

- ▷ **two-player** zero-sum differential **game**
  - stochastic differential equations for state evolution
  - one player is a “fictitious planner” engaged in maximizing social well-being
  - another player investigates the adverse consequences of uncertainty about probabilistic inputs through minimization
- ▷ use “**relative entropy**” to limit or bound the **probabilistic uncertainty**
- ▷ use **numerical PDE methods** along with some **extra twists** for computations

# Uncertainty in valuation

- ▷ construct a “worst-case” probability from the outcome of the two-player game
- ▷ use this probability to make uncertainty adjustments for ambiguity and misspecification concerns in valuation formulations including for the SCC

# Constructing the adjusted measure

- ▷ State evolution:

$$dX_t = \mu_x(X_t, A_t)dt + \sigma_x(X_t, A_t)dW_t$$

where  $A$  is the decision process

- ▷ Girsanov transformation

$$dW_t = H_t dt + dW_t^H$$

with  $dW_t^H$  a Brownian increment under the change of measure

# Constructing the adjusted measure

- ▷ For **misspecification** include a penalty and minimize

$$\min_{H_t} \frac{\partial V(X_t)}{\partial x} \cdot [\sigma_x(X_t, A_t) H_t] + \frac{\xi_m}{2} H_t \cdot H_t$$

- ▷ Let  $\theta$  be an unknown parameter. Hansen-Miao implementation of **smooth ambiguity**

$$-\xi_a \log \left( \int_{\Theta} \exp \left[ -\frac{1}{\xi_a} \frac{\partial V(X_t)}{\partial x} \cdot \mu_x(X_t, A_t; \theta) \right] dQ_t(\theta) \right)$$

where the expectation is taken over  $\theta$ .

# Smooth ambiguity and robust priors

▷ Recall

$$-\xi_a \log \left( \int_{\Theta} \exp \left[ -\frac{1}{\xi_a} \frac{\partial V(X_t)}{\partial x} \cdot \mu_x(X_t, A_t; \theta) \right] dQ_t(\theta) \right)$$

▷ Solve

$$\min_{g, f} \int_{g dQ_t=1} \left[ \frac{\partial V(X_t)}{\partial x} \cdot \mu_x(X_t, A_t; \theta) + \xi_a \log g(\theta) \right] g(\theta) dQ_t(\theta)$$

▷ Smooth ambiguity equivalent to a **change in the probabilities** over  $\theta$  with a relative entropy penalty. Implied **worst-case** relative density:

$$\propto \exp \left[ -\frac{1}{\xi_a} \frac{\partial V(X_t)}{\partial x} \cdot \mu_x(X_t, A_t^*; \theta) \right]$$

where  $A^*$  is the maximizing decision process.


# SCC as an asset price

## Social cash flow


- ▷ Form **nonlinear** impulse responses of emissions today on damages in the future
- ▷ Incorporate **marginal utility** adjustments
- ▷ Depict the **interacting uncertainty** about economic damages and climate change
- ▷ Use **stochastic** discounting under the **uncertainty-adjusted** probabilities to accommodate concerns for ambiguity and model misspecification

Social cost of carbon **agglomerates** the social cash flows using **stochastic discounting** and adjusting for **uncertainty**

# Modeling Framework



# Modeling Framework



# Environment: information

- ▷  $W \doteq \{W_t : t \geq 0\}$  is a multivariate standard **Brownian motion**
- ▷ Let  $Z \doteq \{Z_t : t \geq 0\}$  be a stochastically stable, multivariate **forcing process** with evolution:

$$dZ_t = \mu_z(Z_t)dt + \sigma_z(Z_t)dW_t.$$

Will abstract from  $Z$  in today's talk.

# Environment: production

AK model with adjustment costs

▷ Evolution of capital  $K$

$$dK_t = K_t \left[ \mu_k(Z_t)dt + \phi_0 \log \left( 1 + \phi_1 \frac{I_t}{K_t} \right) dt + \sigma_k \cdot dW_t \right].$$

where  $I_t$  is investment and  $0 < \phi_0 < 1$  and  $\phi_1 > 1$ .

▷ Production

$$C_t + I_t + J_t = \alpha K_t$$

where  $C_t$  is consumption and  $J_t$  is investment in the discovery of new fossil fuel reserves.

# Environment: reserves

- ▷ **Reserve stock**,  $R$ , evolves according to:

$$dR_t = -E_t dt + \psi_0 (R_t)^{1-\psi_1} (J_t)^{\psi_1} + R_t \sigma_R \cdot dW_t$$

where  $\psi_0 > 0$  and  $0 < \psi_1 \leq 1$  and  $E_t$  is the emission of carbon.

- ▷ **Hotelling** fixed stock of reserves is a special case with  $\psi_0 = 0$

# Economic impacts of climate change

- i) adverse impact on **societal preferences**
- ii) adverse impact on **production possibilities**
- iii) adverse impact on the **growth potential**


# Simplified climate dynamics

Two sources:

- i) **emissions** induce changes in the future **carbon concentration** in the atmosphere
- ii) changes in **carbon concentration** alter **temperature** in the future


We characterize the convolution of these two ingredients using results of “**pulse experiments**” for alternative climate models.

# Carbon responses to emission pulses




UVIC model of carbon dynamics

# Temp responses to emission pulses




UVIC model carbon dynamics coupled with the BBC model of temperature dynamics approximated as in Geoffroy (2013)

# Model ambiguity for carbon dynamics



100 gigaton pulse responses for five models

# Model ambiguity for temperature dynamics



100 gigaton pulse responses for five models

# Simplified climate dynamics

Today, and in previous work we use an approximation that simplifies model comparisons


- ▷ Matthews *et al* (2009) and others have purposefully constructed an **approximation** to or a **summary** of climate models outputs:

$$\text{temperature change} \approx CCR \times \text{cumulative emissions}$$

- ▷ abstract from transient changes in temperature


Emissions today have a **long-lasting** impact on temperature in the future where CCR (cumulative carbon response) is a **climate sensitivity measure**.

# Model ambiguity: combined




16 carbon dynamic models and 17 temperature dynamic models

# Model ambiguity: carbon



16 carbon dynamic models

# Model ambiguity: temperature



17 temperature dynamic models

# Damage specification

Posit a **damage process**,  $N$ , to capture **negative externalities** on society imposed by carbon emissions.

$$\log N_t = \Lambda(T_t - T_{pre}) + \nu_n(Z_t)$$

where in our illustration, for  $\tau \leq \bar{\lambda}$  :

$$\Lambda(\tau) = \lambda_1 \tau + \frac{\lambda_2}{2} \tau^2$$

with an additional penalty for  $\tau > \bar{\lambda}$  :

$$\frac{\lambda_2^+}{2} (\tau - \bar{\lambda})^2 .$$

- ▷  $\lambda_2$  gives a **nonlinear damage** adjustment
- ▷  $\lambda_2^+ > 0$  gives a smooth alternative to a **carbon budget**

# Proportional damages


- ▷ the per period (instantaneous) **contribution to preferences** is:

$$\delta(1 - \eta) (\log C_t - \log N_t) + \delta\eta \log E_t$$

where  $\delta > 0$  is the subjective rate of discount and  $0 < \eta < 1$  is a preference parameter that determines the relative importance of emissions in the instantaneous utility function.

- ▷ equivalently this is a model with **proportional damages** to consumption and or production.


# Proportional damage uncertainty




# Uncertainty decomposition

- ▷ Compute the difference between two discounted expected values with different probabilities
  - one forms probabilities by forming simple averages over those implied by alternative models
  - another forms **ambiguity-adjusted** probabilities deduced from the planner's problem
- ▷ Quantify the impact of **uncertainty** on the SCC (social cost of carbon).


# SCC: combined model ambiguity




# SCC: temperature model ambiguity



# SCC: carbon model ambiguity



# Ambiguity-adjusted probabilities



The initial weighting is the same for both the low- and high-damage specifications. The ambiguity-adjusted probabilities remain very close to this at year 50, but are tilted towards the high damage specification (probability .58) at year 100.

# Nonlinearity and uncertainty

Observations:


- ▷ proportionality breaks down with large pulses
- ▷ additional sources of nonlinearity
  - permafrost
  - nonlinear temperature feedback, Zalliapin and Ghil (2010)

# Richer economic model

- ▷ **energy transition**: accelerating the shift away from fossil fuels and towards renewable energy
- ▷ **nature-based solutions**: increasing sink capacity and enhancing resilience through biodiversity conservation
- ▷ **resilience and adaptation**: endogenous economic responses to climate change

These extensions will:

- ▷ open **additional channels** with **uncertain consequences**
- ▷ allow us to investigate how **alternative policies** close the **gap** between actual prices and idealized notions of the **social cost of carbon**

A black and white portrait of Mark Twain, showing him from the chest up. He has white, wavy hair and a prominent white mustache. He is wearing a light-colored, high-collared shirt. The background is dark and out of focus.

Education is the path  
from cocky ignorance to  
miserable uncertainty

- Mark Twain

# Model we used

## Carbon cycle models:

- ▷ Bern3D-LPJ, University of Bern 3D Earth system model with Lund-Potsdam-Jena dynamic global vegetation (Bern3D-LPJ; Ritz et al. 2011; Stocker et al. 2011)
- ▷ CLIMBER2-LPJ, the Potsdam Institute Climate and Biosphere Model (Petoukhov et al. 2000; Montoya et al. 2005)
- ▷ GENIE, the Grid Enabled Integrated Earth system model (GENIE) adapted with an implementation of land use change (Holden et al. 2013)
- ▷ MESMO, version 1.0 of the Minnesota Earth System Model for Ocean biogeochemistry (MESMO 1.0; Matsumoto et al. 2008) (University of Minnesota)
- ▷ UVic.29, version 2.9 of the University of Victoria Earth System Climate Model (UVic ESCM 2.9; Weaver et al. 2001; Eby et al. 2009)

# Model we used

## Temperature models:

- ▷ BCC-CSM1-1, Beijing Climate Center, China Meteorological, Administration Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research)
- ▷ GFDL-ESM2M, NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory
- ▷ CNRM-CM5.1, Centre National de Recherches Météorologiques / Centre Européen de Recherche et Formation, Avancée en Calcul Scientifique
- ▷ GISS-E2-R, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies
- ▷ MPI-ESM-LR. Max Planck Institute for Meteorology

# Complementary econ references

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- ▷ Nordhaus (2018), *Projections and Uncertainties About Climate Change in an Era of Minimal Climate Policies*
- ▷ Weitzman (2012), *GHG Targets as Insurance Against Catastrophic Climate Damages*

# Complementary geosci references

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